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INTRODUCTION
Wild animals are making a surprising comeback across many 
parts of Europe. In the report Wildlife Comeback in Europe 
(Deinet et al. 2013), scientists describe how, why and where 
37 mammal and bird species have recovered over the past 
50 years. The results have been welcomed by many as a 
message of hope, and taken as proof by some that nature 
conservation really works. However, in several areas, concerns 
are growing about the animals’ renewed presence, as well 
as conflicts about how to deal with them (Trouwborst 2010; 
Linnell 2013; Navarro and Pereira 2015). Sometimes even 
crimes of dissent occur (von Essen and Allen 2017).
One of those areas is the Flanders region (northern 
Belgium) where species have resettled after an absence of 
decades or even centuries: red fox, wild boar, cormorant, 
beaver, eagle-owl, otter and very recently also wolf. Their 
recovery invokes opposite reactions and often polarised 
debates in various public forums, ranging from local news 
and social media to the Flemish Parliament. In a recent 
study (Van Herzele et al. 2015) we reveal that, typically, 
the debates unfold along mainly three opposing lines: the 
animals belong versus do not belong here; they are useful and 
provide opportunities versus they pose a threat; nature keeps 
itself in balance versus we need to control populations. It is 
these basic contradictions that supply the ‘fault-lines’ along 
which pro and contra positions are taken, social tensions 
are accumulated and conflicts are generated or perpetuated 
(Giddens 1981; Elchardus 2007).
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From the above study we learn that apparent divides over 
wild returnees are not merely a manifestation of incompatible 
perceptions and opinions or a clash of visions, but are generated 
in large part by the debate itself. Results show, indeed, that 
several dynamics increase polarisation and complicate the 
resolution of conflict: the alignment of arguments along binary 
oppositions (dichotomisation), the scaling up and linking of 
issues that were previously separate, and the imposition of 
stereotypes and stigmas on particular groups (Van Herzele 
et al. 2015). The polarising dynamics are, we argue, a direct 
but unintended outcome of the discussants’ rhetorical practices, 
as they interact with their opponents, (potential) allies, as well 
as public audiences in their striving for credibility, legitimacy 
and support. Yet, such processes still remain poorly understood. 
One reason may be that researchers are deterred from exploring 
them because of the methodological challenges associated with 
the seeming messiness of public forums. Participants in public 
discussions can be quite diverse, not coherent as a group and 
motivations for participation will vary as well, which results in 
diverse discourse moves (Grabrill and Pigg 2012). Moreover, 
participants make claims without feeling a need, or being able, 
to reason it out or to justify it explicitly (Van Herzele 2004). 
Another reason probably is that representationalist assumptions 
are still dominant in the wildlife literature. In that view, what 
people say (or how they respond to questionnaires) is taken 
to represent their attitude or perception toward a specific 
wildlife species or conservation practice, their ‘wildlife value 
orientation’ (Fulton et al. 1996), or any other predisposition 
or pre-existing factor. Such focus may well contribute to 
describing the variation in public understanding and support, 
but falls short for studying the constitutive power of language 
and the rhetoric we encounter daily in words, narratives and 
images.
According to Aristotle, rhetoric is the ability to find the 
available means of persuasion in any given case. In this 
sense, rhetoric includes logical argument, but it also allows 
for appeals to be made to the character or credibility of the 
speaker and the emotions of the audience. Clearly, rhetoric is 
inextricably enmeshed in language, societal relationships and 
actions (Mayhew 1997; Cheney et al. 2004) and as such it is 
also central, although often unacknowledged, to the practice 
fields of wildlife conservation. Some examples include experts 
writing their reports in support of the re-introduction of white-
tailed eagle, beaver and lynx to Scotland (Arts et al. 2012), 
and Greek livestock farmers creating, as a coping strategy, 
incriminating rumours about the wolf and the actors around 
its re-introduction (Theodorakea and von Essen 2016). And, 
as we will see with the red fox and the wild boar in Flanders, 
also the spontaneous comeback of wild animals is a source of 
emergent rhetorical activity. 
This article examines public discussions in various media 
and forums about two returnees to Flanders: the red fox and 
the wild boar. The aim of the research is to understand how 
rhetorical practices may help to form the contradictory basis 
for the revealed fault-lines, and as such may perpetuate social 
division over time. To address this broad research question, 
we use the classical theory of stasis as a systematic method 
for locating the points of dissension and understanding the 
discussants’ rhetorical efforts at these points. The results 
obtained will allow us to discuss the role of public rhetoric in 
the continuation and exacerbation of public divides. 
STASIS THEORY AND THE CONDUCT OF 
DEBATE
Drawing on Aristotle’s physical science, Otto Dieter (1950) 
demonstrates how the political and rhetorical concept of stasis 
(or staseis in the plural) originates from the physical concept 
of stasis in ancient Greek culture and thought. In this sense 
stasis refers to:
 … both an end and a beginning of motion, both a stop 
and a start, the turning, or the transitional standing at the 
moment of reversal of movement (Dieter 1950).
Analogous to these contrary motions, ancient rhetoricians 
recognised staseis as temporary standings in-between 
contradictories or contrary statements. Stasis theory was then 
developed as a practical method to bring to the fore the points 
of disagreement in a debate. The theory posits four staseis 
that help identify the types of questions that are at issue, that 
is, whether it concerns an issue of fact, definition, quality or 
jurisdiction. By way of illustration, we cite phrases from Bob 
Marley’s famous song1: 1) ‘Stasis of fact’: Does it exist? Did 
it happen? Who did it? “I shot the sheriff, but I didn’t shoot no 
deputy, oh no!” 2) ‘Stasis of definition’: What is it? What is the 
nature or definition of the act? “They say it is a capital offense, 
but I swear it was in self-defence.” 3) ‘Stasis of quality’: What 
is the quality, value or importance of the act? What were 
the mitigating or aggravating circumstances? “Sheriff John 
Brown always hated me, for what, I don’t know.” 4) ‘Stasis of 
jurisdiction’: Who has jurisdiction in this case and what action 
is called for? “If I am guilty, I will pay.”
Whereas stasis theory is most often described as a logical 
template for judicial function2, it has a much wider scope of 
application, also including the design, conduct and research 
of practices of deliberation (Dimock 2009; Graham and 
Herndl 2011). By working through the stasis questions, the 
interactants can identify the issue(s) on which the case hinges 
and the point(s) at which they disagree or reach an impasse. 
Once the arguable points of issue are found, stasis may function 
as a temporary moment or ‘standstill’ from which to begin 
discussion and whereby the discussants can bring into focus 
the divergent views, mediate among them and avoid arguments 
that are superfluous to the debate. As such, stasis has been 
considered a means for creating common ground between 
contending parties and a guide to deliberative judgement 
(Dimock 2009; Graham and Herndl 2011). 
Furthermore, and as we will show, stasis theory can provide 
insight as to how and why actual public debates take the course 
they do. As Fahnestock (1986) notes, “the system of ordered 
questions represented by stasis theory” turns out to be capable 
of accounting for the ways issues naturally develop in public 
forums. Typically, people have to be convinced that a situation 
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exists before they ask what kind of situation it is and move 
to decisions about whether it is good or bad and what should 
be done about it. This classical sequence – though not always 
in place – does suggest that the stasis questions are in some 
way connected to each other. One plausible explanation is an 
underlying logical structure. Marsh (2006) proposes that the 
first three staseis are structured upon a syllogistic foundation. A 
syllogism is a form of logical argument that joins two (or more) 
propositions or ‘premises’ to arrive at a conclusion. In the case 
of the sheriff the syllogism can be constructed as follows: 
Minor premise The defendant killed a sheriff
Major premise Killing a sheriff is a capital offense
Conclusion The defendant is guilty of a capital offense
The minor premise attaches its subject, the defendant 
(minor term), to the action of killing a sheriff (middle term). 
The major premise attaches the middle term to a definition or 
class (major term), in this case capital offence. Finally, the 
conclusion attaches the major term to the original subject: the 
defender is guilty of a capital offence. Overall, the purpose of 
the speech is to logically attach the major term to the minor 
term through the middle term. 
While Marsh (2006) deals with deductive syllogism (as 
in the above example), which is just one but strong way to 
infer a conclusion, our approach is open to eliciting other 
reasoning modes, including but not limited to induction and 
abduction (Flach and Kakas 2000; Walton 2001; Govier 2010). 
Furthermore, to say that logical syllogisms are at the basis 
of stasis does not mean that discussants must argue in such 
syllogisms. In everyday rhetoric one can leave out whatever 
premises or conclusions the listener or reader can supply (as 
in Aristotle’s ‘enthymeme’, also called ‘shortened syllogism’ 
and ‘interactive syllogism’) or derive general rules from ad hoc 
examples without detracting from the power of the argument. 
What is most interesting about Marsh’s theory of the syllogistic 
foundation of stasis is that it goes beyond the structure of a 
single argument and looks to reconstruct the reasoning that 
links (explicit and implicit) premises to conclusions at the 
level of the whole debate. This enables in turn to envision a 
range of available rhetorical options under each stasis, which 
we believe is helpful for understanding the conduct of debate: 
‘Stasis of fact’: the emphasis is on the minor premise. 
Accusers would support the attachment of the action (middle 
term) to the subject (minor term); defendants would remove 
this linkage, if possible. In the sheriff case, the storyteller 
who is charged by the community for the killing of a deputy 
denies the act: “I didn’t shoot no deputy”. In other words, he 
dissociates himself from the action. As a consequence, the 
question under discussion becomes: “Did he do it?” and we 
have a stasis of fact. However, the storyteller is also admitting 
to shooting the sheriff. Thus, the action of killing still applies 
and the parties in debate could move to the next stasis. 
‘Stasis of definition’: the emphasis is on the major premise. 
Accusers would attempt to link the action (middle term) to a 
negative characterisation or definition (major term); defendants 
could consider attacking this linkage. For a syllogism to be 
logical, the middle term must apply to everything that it 
conveys, for instance, not some killings of sheriffs, but all 
killings. The storyteller claims he acted in self-defence, when 
he suddenly saw the sheriff aiming to shoot him down. Thus, 
he tries to damage the attachment of killing a sheriff to the 
definition of capital offense by establishing a ‘syllogistic flaw’: 
not all killings of sheriffs are capital offense. Put another way: 
attacking the definition involves proving that the opponent 
has not put the phenomenon or action into its proper ‘class’. 
‘Stasis of quality’: if both premises hold, then the conclusion 
logically follows. Defendants who cannot contest one of these 
must retreat to the stasis of quality if they still wish to escape 
from this negative conclusion. Because the definition is already 
attached to the subject, defendants can only show why that 
attachment is weak to somehow lessen the degree of guilt. 
In our example, the storyteller places the event in a broader 
context of hostility to him – this particular sheriff hated him 
for no discernible reason and was frequently harassing him – 
which could possibly make the killing justified or outweigh its 
outcomes. Thus, defendants could ask the audience to evaluate 
the subject in light of special circumstances or a broader 
perspective. Obviously, accusers then must convincingly refute 
that argumentation. 
‘Stasis of jurisdiction’: this stasis is often employed when 
processes or circumstances leading to decision and action are 
questioned, rather than issues of content. So, it falls outside 
the syllogism. A good example is Kramer and Olson’s (2002) 
analysis of President Clinton’s self-defence in the Monica 
Lewinsky sex scandal: Clinton characterised his behaviour 
as private conduct (definition) and claimed that his family 
and his God were therefore the rightful judges (jurisdiction).
Even though discussants in public forums tend to utilise the 
full range of staseis (Fahnestock 1986), they may still choose 
which stasis to emphasise. They may anticipate on what the 
implications will be in the next staseis and shift emphasis 
among the staseis, when necessary, as the debate unfolds 
(Kramer and Olson 2002). And, of course they are free to 
choose their rhetorical strategies beyond the classical options 
mentioned above. 
MATERIAL AND ANALYSIS
The empirical material spans a period of well over two 
decades of public debate occurring across a wide variety of 
forums, starting in the early 1990s with the quick spread of 
the red fox in Flanders and complemented one decade later 
with first appearances of the wild boar (see Van Herzele 
et al. 2015, for background and details). These species were 
chosen because their return gave rise to recurring commotion 
and conflict, as shown by widespread media coverage and 
political interest over many years. Another reason was to 
maximise variation in the data. Since the two species get 
involved in different events (e.g. foxes attacking backyard 
chickens and wild boars destroying agricultural crops), they 
will add variation in terms of participants to the discussions 
and issues under discussion. 
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To begin, we searched the news databases from the Research 
Institute for Nature and Forest and the Flemish Info Centre 
for Agriculture and Horticulture for items of news and 
opinion related to foxes and boars in Flanders between 2006 
and 2015. Duplicate or similar articles were omitted from 
the search results. All the retrieved articles – 72 (red fox) 
and 92 (wild boar), of which nearly half from the periods 
2011-2012 and 2012-2013 respectively – were screened and 
coded according to the type of event. Any judgements made 
about the animals in question or the way they are (not) to be 
handled were underlined with markers. The press database of 
the Belgian newspaper and magazine publishers (GoPress) 
was used to further extend and diversify the dataset. Additional 
searches focused on articles earlier than 2006 (first articles on 
red fox appeared in 1994, on wild boar in 2002), reader letters 
and online comments, and articles related to events that were 
less discussed in the initial dataset (e.g., poultry killed by 
foxes and car accidents with boars). We complemented this 
material with internet searches to access local news and social 
media, websites and online forums of local authorities, political 
parties and main interest groups (Bird Protection Flanders, 
Natuurpunt, Hubertus Hunting Association and Nature Help 
Centre). Furthermore, we drew on television debates, nature 
and wildlife magazines, agricultural media, presentations 
given at seminars, expert advisory reports and parliamentary 
sources (annals, hearings, commissions) related to fox or boar 
until 2017. Again, we marked text fragments representing a 
judgement about the matter. Together the forums observed 
represent a wide variety of rhetorical situations and discussants, 
including politicians, public officials, conservationists, 
scientists, farmers, hunters, wildlife rescue volunteers, chicken 
owners, residents and other members of the public. 
We departed from the previously identified fault-lines 
– belonging/not belonging; opportunity/threat; control by 
intervention/nature controls (Van Herzele et al. 2015) – to 
examine the patterns of reasoning and rhetoric that cut across the 
variety of events, forums and discussants. For this purpose, we 
perform a stasis analysis at two levels: 1) Across the staseis: we 
examine which type(s) of reasoning is structuring the whole of 
the debate. Therefore, the marked text passages were screened 
for judgements (claims or conclusions) relating to the fault 
lines. Wherever this took place, we tried to grasp the naturally 
occurring ‘logic’ in the passage by laying out the premises 
explicitly and examining the ways in which they were connected 
to conclusions (Govier 2010). Typical reasoning patterns were 
identified and reconstructed by constant comparison between 
passages. 2) Within the staseis: we examine the rhetorical 
practices in the four staseis. To this end, we departed from the 
above reconstructions of reasonings to screen the marked text 
passages for words and statements in support or in opposition 
of them. These were coded according to the stasis to which they 
belonged. The four-part analytical structure of stasis was used 
to indicate where points of contention lie and to synthesise what 
rhetorical strategies were employed in each of them. 
We also used these two levels of analysis to present results: 
by first reconstructing the reasoning of the judgements we 
increase understanding of specific rhetorical strategies. Finally, 
instructive quotes were selected, translated into English and 
used to illustrate the results.
RESULTS
Belonging versus Not Belonging
The issue of belonging is frequently raised when animal species 
first move into an area and less so after they became established. 
The whole of this debate shows that the public judgement 
of belonging is conditioned by antecedent judgements of 
‘naturalness’: a species’ presence within its natural range, its 
natural role in the ecosystem, the genetic purity of the species, 
and the spontaneous nature of the species’ comeback. Opposite 
reasonings can be reconstructed as follows: 
Minor 
premise
Foxes (or boars) 
returned on their own
Foxes (or boars) were 
released
Major 
premise
Animals returning on 
their own is natural
Releasing animals is 
unnatural
Conclusion The presence of foxes 
(or boars) is natural
The presence of foxes 
(or boars) is unnatural
The radically opposite conclusions (the presence is either 
natural or unnatural) proceed logically from the premises in a 
deductive syllogism. It is in particular the dichotomisation of 
the naturalness concept (natural/unnatural) that creates a strong 
contrast. Yet the major premises are complementary rather than 
contradictory. Both are based on common sense of naturalness 
as being spontaneous and not artificial, implying that human 
intervention is unnatural. Thus, the major premise operates as 
a shared though usually unstated principle. 
The judgement of naturalness provides a subsequent, 
essential underpinning for the judgement of belonging: 
‘natural’ is qualified as belonging and ‘unnatural’ as not 
belonging. However, the linkage between the two remains 
largely unstated and we find no mention or discussion of 
why naturalness and belonging are related. Yet terms such as 
‘revival’ and ‘reconquering its place’ refer to a present situation 
in light of the past: the species come back where they belong. 
Much argumentation builds on the above deductive logic 
with dichotomies reinforcing the reasoning. For example, 
informative texts and expert presentations about foxes and boars 
put their renewed, spontaneous presence in contrast to human-
induced disappearance and subsequent absence in the past:
Minor premise Foxes (or boars) have been absent due to 
overhunting
Major premise Overhunting is an unnatural cause of extinction
Conclusion The absence of foxes (or boars) was unnatural
Factual and definitional dichotomies work together here to 
support the conclusion of the initial syllogism (if absence is 
unnatural, then presence is natural) and to refute the conclusion 
of the opposite syllogism. This was nicely summarised by a 
fox expert3: “It is not its presence today that is unnatural, but 
its absence between 1850 and, say, 1990.”
Thinking of the return process as a shift from unnatural 
absence to natural presence facilitated seeing the return of 
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the red fox or the wild boar to Flanders as something positive, 
and evaluating the species as belonging in Flanders, which 
in turn may help disarm possible objections to the species’ 
return. In what follows, we focus on the rhetorical practices 
within the separate staseis. One important observation is that 
the deductive logic and its premises, as outlined above, gave 
much direction to both pro and con rhetoric:
Stasis of Fact 
Much of the public rhetoric concentrated on the ‘how’ question 
of a species’ return. The presented ‘facts’ were contradictory 
at this point: species returning on their own versus being 
released. Given the broad acceptance of the principle that 
human intervention is unnatural, the facts were much decisive 
for the conclusion of the deductive reasoning outlined above. 
Indeed a main rhetorical strategy here was to address the 
minor premise. One example is pointing at signs of human 
intervention such as ear tags and tame behaviour to destroy 
the linkage between the species and its spontaneous return. In 
most cases, however, strong evidence was lacking and attempts 
aimed to decrease plausibility of the linkage by spreading 
rumours about nature activists releasing foxes or hunters 
releasing wild boars. At the same time, but less conspicuously, 
proponents made spontaneous return plausible by pointing at 
relevant species characteristics (travelling long distances and 
being adaptive to multiple environments), favourable factors 
(available food resources and mild winters for piglets), and 
expanding populations in neighbouring countries. However, 
that evidence did not prevent opponents from spreading stories 
of release, which in turn created suspicions regarding their 
intended influence on the public opinion and the process of 
debate (see the stasis of jurisdiction).
Stasis of Definition 
The prevailing deductive reasoning owes much of its strength 
to a broadly accepted principle: human intervention, such 
as releasing animals and hunting to extinction, is unnatural. 
However, this premise usually is implicit and uncontested. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, rhetorical options in the stasis 
of definition were mostly left unused. A notable exception is 
a scientific report4, which recognises that some fox releases 
exist (signs are sometimes obvious: a fox with a flea collar), 
but circumvents the definition of an ‘unnatural phenomenon’ 
by stating there is on one hand the general phenomenon of fox 
return and on the other a handful cases of fox release, which are 
of all times and can therefore not considered an explanation for 
change. By excluding cases of fox release from the definition 
of a phenomenon, a syllogistic flaw is established: foxes can 
be released without being a phenomenon. And, these cases are 
reduced to single incidents with no general significance: “At 
best they can occasionally offer an explanation for a single 
animal’s isolated appearance in time and space.”
This strategy of opposing the general against the singular 
defines that only the former counts as phenomenon. Thus, 
if something is not a phenomenon it cannot be an unnatural 
phenomenon. However, due to the lack of elaborating 
discussion in the stasis of definition it remains unclear why 
the issue of species return was often defined in terms of 
naturalness. 
Stasis of Quality 
Belonging is not a fixed quality: it may be lost after a long 
absence of the species, through changes in the environment, 
because of the species’ behaviour (damage risk) or other 
circumstances (e.g. uncontrollable population growth). It 
was frequently argued that we don’t have the appropriate 
environment for them:
 Wild boars need vast forests, which are rare here.5
 This species [the red fox] does not belong anymore to our 
modest-sized Flemish biotopes and densely populated 
society.6
So the foxes and boars were placed in the present urbanised 
circumstances, which were deemed an unsuitable environment 
for them. This was sometimes further emphasised by contrast 
with the natural not-yet-urbanised environment of the past, 
like saying that the Flemish landscape is very different to 
when fox or wild boar last roamed this country. A typical 
response strategy by conservationists was not to deny the lack 
of appropriate environment but to consider it a duty to provide 
it, as, for instance, the director of the Natuurpunt organisation 
states in a newspaper opinion article: 
 It is necessary to create large, continuous nature areas. 
These offer a safe place to live for all large animals, such 
as deer, otters, beavers and of course wild boars.7
Thus, the pressing issue of environmental circumstances 
was reformulated in a positive way: that of being something 
good we can and even should provide for our wildlife; a right 
to habitat in some sense. As a result, answering the question 
of what should be done (stasis of jurisdiction) was no longer 
about whether or not to eradicate, but how to provide space 
for those animals.
Stasis of Jurisdiction
Judgements of belonging and habitat availability formed 
the basis for jurisdiction, at least initially. The government, 
for instance, first called for complete eradication of wild 
boar, but now accepts its ‘controlled presence’ in areas with 
a sufficiently largely connected habitat. Elsewhere a policy 
of ‘zero-tolerance’ is pursued. Legislative argumentation in 
Parliament shows that this shift in policy was motivated by 
practical considerations about inability to control immigration 
from abroad and the expected lack of public support for 
eradication. Moreover, both hunter and nature conservation 
associations pointed at being presented with a fait accompli, 
thus placing the issue of belonging outside the scope of the 
discussion:
 It’s much too late! We will never succeed in removing the 
wild boars completely. There will be no other option than 
living with their presence.8
Furthermore, the processes leading to decisions were 
strongly challenged by insinuations about those trying to 
influence the judgement of others. So it was said that hunters 
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sought to turn public opinion against the fox by spreading 
false stories of release and escape, leading people to judge 
the presence of foxes as unnatural. At local news forums, we 
find some attempts at questioning the public’s legitimacy as 
a judge: “Who are we humans to determine which species 
belong or not?”9
Opportunity versus Threat
Damage and risk are dominant themes in debates about wild 
returnees. They are discussed most intensely at the occasion of 
incidents. And, as incidents increase in frequency, we also see 
increasing attempts to highlight the species’ benefits. Hence the 
fault-line grows sharper. The main argumentation is that the 
species is a threat to people and/or biodiversity and requires 
immediate action. Deduction may be used to characterise 
a species in terms of threat or benefit (the latter usually in 
response or anticipation of the former): 
Minor 
premise
Foxes kill vulnerable 
ground nesting birds
Wild boars root up the 
forest soil
Major 
premise
Predation of vulnerable 
species is a threat to 
biodiversity
Rooting provides a fertile 
seed bed for native flora
Conclusion Foxes are a threat to 
biodiversity
Wild boars benefit native 
flora
Such generalisation by way of deduction often goes together 
with induction. Unlike deduction, which merely applies 
an established principle, induction creates principles from 
observation. These are drawn (or induced) from examples or 
cases, e.g. each subsequent case of predation contributes to the 
definition or principle that foxes are a threat. Typically, after 
describing a number of damage cases, the species concerned is 
classified as harmful, nuisance or at the very least, a problem 
species. The listed cases can be either incidents of the same 
type (numbers of chicken attacks in recent weeks) or different 
types (wild boar destroying crops, causing a traffic accident, 
attacking people and spreading diseases). The final step to a 
general principle or classification is not necessarily taken, but 
the idea that foxes or boars might be generally classified as 
vermin or pests is what their defenders were most afraid of. 
Hence, they sought to rescue the species’ image or ‘reputation’ 
by assigning it to a favourable class (useful species, beautiful 
animal, etc.). 
Stasis of Fact
Defenders and accusers respectively minimised the species’ 
harmful actions and denied the useful ones, thus anticipating 
judgement in the next staseis. A frequent strategy was to make 
the cases (brought by the counterparty) less relevant and even 
implausible or non-existent. 
Factual evidence took many forms and rhetorical force was 
more important than mere information. There were frequent 
appeals to experience (“I personally do not know anyone who 
has ever had such an experience or even has a friend to whom 
this happened”) and popular wisdom (“wild boars are very shy 
of humans and will not attack them”) especially in readers’ 
reactions to news. The following argument (on a discussion 
forum for do-it-yourselfers) is remarkable as it represents foxes 
as making a deliberate choice between easy (but harmful) and 
tiresome (but beneficial) actions, the former making the latter 
implausible:
 The fox will not tire itself out with controlling rat, rabbit 
and frog populations, but simply steal people’s chickens, 
ducks and bunnies. So the fox is a nuisance and nothing 
more.10
Where the linkage between the species and the harmful 
action cannot be denied, defenders may still have options to 
minimise and distract attention from it or identify an alternative 
perpetrator. For example, the mammal working group of 
Natuurpunt argued on its website that the fox is not the sole 
predator of the ground nesters and that poor land use policies 
are the real problem: “The problem is not so much the fox, 
but the impoverished landscape that offers little coverage.” 11
Stasis of Definition 
Accusers of foxes or boars, as well as the popular press, 
tended to define the action or situation in terms of threat, 
damage and risk. So it was common practice in news articles 
to depict fox predation on poultry by using the language of 
criminal cases, i.e. theft, robbery and murder. A favoured 
strategy by defenders, on various forums, was to de-emphasise 
the species’ agency by promoting an alternative definition: 
instead of stealing the chickens, the fox is actually receiving 
a meal (‘a free buffet’). Likewise, maize fields were called 
‘a set table’ for the wild boar. The animals’ involvement in 
the damage is not denied but the new definition – stated in 
culinary terms - enables taking away the responsibility from 
them and put it on the complaining victims (chicken owners 
and farmers). 
A more classical but frequent rhetorical move was to 
make invalid an inductive generalisation by introducing an 
opposite case, for instance, native plants being destroyed by 
(instead of benefiting from) wild boar rooting. Furthermore, 
introducing principles that were somewhat different but still 
generally accepted enabled deducing an opposite conclusion, 
for instance, that prey populations are likely to benefit from 
foxes (instead of being threatened by them), as we know that 
predators eliminate the sick and weak animals. 
Stasis of Quality
The accumulation of damage cases and their circulation through 
news and social media offered considerable opportunities for 
generalisation, evaluating the species in question as unwanted. 
By repeatedly drawing public attention to instances of damage 
and risk ‘the problem’ was becoming increasingly serious. 
Further, the alarming potential of numbers was used to make 
the most compelling case for intervention, for example in 
Parliament:
 INBO [Research Institute for Nature and Forest] estimates 
the fox population at 30,000 (….). The fox needs a prey 
every day: multiply that by the population, so you know 
how things stand.12 
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By contrast, defenders tried to weaken any unfavourable 
evaluation. A popular move was to argue by analogy, that is, 
to perceive a similarity between situations to use it as a basis 
to infer a further similarity: what was learned in the old case 
can be applied to the new one. For example, to change public 
perception of the wild boar being a threat in the local forest, 
Natuurpunt’s local division chair used the well-known case of 
a popular holiday destination: 
 Every year hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people 
go hiking in the Ardennes where, so to speak, it is black with 
wild boars. Nowhere in the Ardennes is anyone discouraged 
from enjoying nature because wild boars would roam. I dare 
to conclude that a wild boar is not such a big threat. 13
Another strategy was to put a new perspective on cases (for 
example, making a damage case less relevant by placing it 
in the context of our country’s wealth). A popular rhetorical 
option was to see the situation from the animal’s perspective 
to make the harmful action unavoidable and even justified. A 
nice example is this argument by a fox expert: “Every henhouse 
is, in principle, in a foxes’ territory”14. Moreover, seen from a 
fox’s perspective, it would be silly not to eat those easy-to-catch 
chickens, especially in circumstances of wild prey shortage. A 
listener to a radio programme made this point by posing the 
rhetorical, empathic question “What would you do for food 
when all you have left is a chicken coop?”15
Stasis of Jurisdiction 
In general, opinions regarding damage management options 
were linked to how the situation was defined and evaluated in 
the previous staseis. If foxes or boars were mainly presented 
as damaging animals or vermin, it seemed more acceptable 
to shoot them than when damage cases were presented as bad 
practice and negligence. The latter interpretation was supported 
by making references to available technical solutions, such as 
the ‘fox-proof henhouse’ and electric fences against wild boar. 
However, placing responsibility on those suffering damages 
was actually a much-contested issue, sometimes referred to as 
“the world upside-down”16. 
In addition, processes leading to decision-making were 
openly criticised. Often, hunters were targeted for not being 
open about their interests when they strived for fewer hunting 
restrictions. For example, a guest blogger for Knack Magazine 
criticised that hunters stand up to defend the chicken owners, 
which he called an ‘abuse’ of the chickens and their owners, 
and a smokescreen to hide their true motivation: “The hunters 
do not care about the chickens, but about the legally, and 
especially the illegally released reared pheasants that are 
heavily attacked by the fox.”17 
Furthermore, in response to increasing complaints about foxes, 
nature conservationists launched the slogan that people must 
learn to live with foxes: “Coexisting with fox? Yes we can!”.
Control by Intervention versus Nature Controls
Population density and control are among the most divisive 
issues once the wild returnees become established. Claims 
for intervention – i.e. measures to control the growth and 
spread of populations – often arise directly from the events 
and information reported in the news media. Besides that, we 
find an intense discussion about why population control is 
needed or not needed. The arguments proceed from seemingly 
contradictory deductions: 
Minor 
premise
Foxes have (except humans) 
no natural enemies anymore
The fox acts as a top 
predator
Major 
premise
Natural enemies keep 
animal populations under 
control
The numbers of top 
predators are regulated 
by prey abundance
Conclusion The fox population is out of 
natural control
The numbers of foxes 
are naturally regulated
Following the first line of reasoning, it would be humans’ 
task to regulate the fox populations in the absence of other 
natural enemies. The second, by contrast, makes us believe 
that intervention is unnecessary and even undesirable. Whereas 
the two conclusions are in contradiction, the premises are not 
necessarily. The first conclusion is deduced from the broadly 
shared concept of ‘natural enemy’ (therefore the major premise 
was unstated). The second reasoning, however, serves to 
dismantle the deductive logic of the first. This is classically 
done by means of establishing (implicitly) a syllogistic flaw: 
not all animals are controlled through natural enemies. 
An alternative logic frequently applied in this debate is 
to reverse the deductive reasoning, that is, to start from the 
conclusion – the population is growing out of control – and 
to treat it as an observation that calls for an explanation. Such 
reasoning is commonly called ‘abduction’ and goes from given 
data to a ‘best explanation’. The passage from the observed 
data to the explanation (e.g. foxes lack natural enemies) can be 
mediated by a general rule or principle (e.g. natural enemies 
function to control populations). 
The abductive reasoning mode is most clearly apparent when 
people are faced with new evidence or a situation they had not 
encountered before. A typical example is the public reactions to 
a news article18 reporting on a controlled hunt aimed at curbing 
the wild boar population. The result was that the hunters 
finished the day without one kill, an observation that led to 
a lively discussion. In sum, the public comments produced 
two plausible explanations: either the numbers of wild boar 
are highly exaggerated or the hunters are great bunglers (and 
the boar is much smarter). These explanations in turn gave 
rise to new observations, again requiring an explanation. For 
instance, the explanation that the numbers of wild boar are 
an exaggeration was transformed into the perception that the 
hunters exaggerate numbers, which was then explained by 
hunting interest: 
Minor 
premise
110 hunters did not 
shoot a single wild boar
The hunters overstate the 
number of wild boar
Major 
premise
You cannot shoot what is 
not there!
Hunters constantly search 
for opportunities to 
hunt (and display their 
masculinity)
Conclusion The wild boar population 
is much overestimated
The hunters have an 
interest in overstating 
wild boar numbers
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Stasis of Fact
The facts of the situation create pressure to act. In several 
forums, including the Flemish Parliament, the mere factual 
report of increase in population numbers sounded an alarm 
for action. Still it remained unclear how many foxes or boars 
are actually out there and whether the available estimates are 
realistic. In these circumstances, abduction (see above) appears 
a tentative reasoning well suited for dealing with incomplete 
and uncertain information and drawing conclusions from it. 
The reasoning starts from what is known (or presumed to be 
known) to find a plausible explanation, but it may be given 
up or altered later when new evidence is brought to light. In 
the above example, the presumed observation that the hunters 
exaggerate the numbers of wild boar was rejected by the fact 
that it’s not the hunters who count and estimate the number of 
boars (i.e. the linkage in the minor premise between the subject 
and the minor term was removed). 
As we noted above, explanations can be transformed into 
observations in the course of interaction. And, deductive 
characterisations (the situation is out of control, there is an 
overpopulation) can be treated as a factual observation too. 
The interplay of all these ‘facts’ makes it hard to determine 
what is precisely the point of contention in this stasis. Also, it 
often happened that when new facts emerged, they were seized 
upon and used by discussants to put forward their pre-existing 
favourite explanations. 
Furthermore, predictions of future facts, specifically what the 
effects of a particular intervention will be, created arguable cases. 
For instance, a frequently used argument from expert opinion 
against the extension of fox hunting was that it will have the 
adverse effect of that intended: new foxes (maybe infected with 
tapeworm) will rapidly move into the emptied territories. More 
specifically, it was predicted – referring to the self-regulating 
mechanisms within fox populations – that the killing of foxes 
will result in a reproductive reaction: more females will 
participate in reproduction and their litters will increase. 
Stasis of Definition
The discussions were filled with principles and theories. 
As mentioned, these were used to describe and predict 
(by deduction) or to explain (by abduction) situations, in 
particular changes in populations and effects of intervention. 
However, such principles were rarely discussed in public. 
At best one may try to raise doubts over them, as in the case 
of the self-regulation of fox populations. For example, the 
Hubertus hunting association’s spokesman questioned the real 
consequences of relying on such theory in Parliament: 
 There is a theoretical model where, without intervention, 
the population will stabilise. The question is at what level 
it will happen, if it happens at all. The neighbours all 
intervene. Does Flanders dare to wait until the theoretical, 
never tested stabilisation model becomes reality?19
Sometimes analogical arguments were used to demolish the 
established belief or principle that hunting is needed to prevent 
population explosion, for instance, a Dutch fox expert in the 
same parliamentary hearing:
 There is everywhere in Europe an increase in the number 
of foxes, regardless of the hunting intensity. So measures 
to intensify hunting do not lead to population decrease or 
disappearance from certain areas. That’s what researchers 
have demonstrated everywhere.
The apparent firmness of principles was particularly evident 
in popular moral wisdom principles, often expressed at local 
news forums, such as “Every animal has the right to exist”, 
and “Mother Nature should not be patronised but she herself 
ensures balance”20. Arguments of this kind tended to block 
any further discussion. Scientists, too, may try to popularise 
their universal theories with lay audiences, for instance, by 
referring to the reproductive reaction in a fox population as 
“pruning stimulates blooming”, a principle often recited by 
fox defenders in various forums.
Stasis of Quality
The issue of control is closely linked to the question whether 
there are too many foxes or boars. Some opponents of 
intervention sought to minimise or normalise the situation so 
as to make it more acceptable, but on the whole, there was 
little discussion on this question. For those who thought that 
nature itself ensures balance it was not an issue at all. The same 
goes for defenders of animals’ rights. They all kept to their 
positions. But also, those in nature administrations may push 
the question aside, for instance, a leading official interviewed 
in the newspapers:
 Limburg has too many wild boars, there is no discussion 
about that. Hunters should be given the appropriate means 
to hunt as efficiently as possible because the cull figure 
must go up.21
Clearly issues of population density and growth – although 
often expressed in quality-related terms like ‘overpopulation’ 
and ‘explosion’ – were hardly discussed in terms of what can 
be considered an acceptable population size. Parliamentarians, 
for example, would rather employ population estimates one-
sidedly to highlight the severity and urgency of the situation, 
and to question government policies and achievements in this 
regard. This regularly put the Minister in a defensive position 
and, typically, she was also relying on numbers: “The fact 
that across Flanders already more than thousand wild boars 
have been shot in 2017 is a proof that there is action on the 
ground.”22 An opposition party promptly challenged this 
positive interpretation: “The fact that a thousand are being shot 
today can be a warning signal that there is huge population 
and therefore the shooting is somewhat easier”.
Further, different parties shared the perception that wild boar 
control is difficult in the current circumstance of landowners, 
especially nature conservation organisations who use their 
property right to prohibit hunting on their land. 
Stasis of Jurisdiction
Most of the debate involved either a call for (mostly 
unspecified) interventions aimed at controlling fox or boar 
populations, or a contest against specific interventions as 
proposed in legislative proposals or implemented in practice. 
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Discussants relied on diverse principles, ranging from animals’ 
rights to scientific and other ideas about balance in nature. 
Those calling for population control mostly referred directly to 
actual (or expected) instances of damage. But there was much 
uncertainty about how this should be done, for example, can 
hunting effectively reduce or halt population growth? Focusing 
on such issues as population control raised crucial questions 
concerning legitimacy and expertise to oversee, judge and 
handle the situation. These questions (voiced and unvoiced) 
also remained unanswered in Parliament. Instead of clarifying 
the differences of opinion, the discussions concentrated on 
criticising the processes of decision-making. For instance, 
insinuations were made about the Minister’s decision to ease 
restrictions on fox hunting, which was said to be influenced 
by hunting interests: “Minister, I find it scandalous that you, 
as environment minister, apparently allow yourself to be 
involved and that you do not have the backbone to resist the 
hunting lobby!”23
It was striking, how quickly, in various forums, criticism of 
decision-making and intervention evolved into a rhetoric of 
shaming and blaming. Apart from occasional ‘ad-hominem 
attacks’ (like above on the Minister’s character), this form of 
rhetoric also involved the continued repetition of narratives 
that portray dissenters in a bad light. Hunters, in particular, 
were the target of discrediting practices.
DISCUSSION 
Overall, this research shows that the debates over wildlife 
comeback evolve on the basis of a continuous alternation of 
participants reaffirming their own standpoints and subverting 
those of the opponent. The rhetoric to do so is hands-on, 
practical and often somewhat messy, however, our analysis 
shows a constant striving for ‘logic’, meaning that participants 
engage in debate by producing premises and inferences that 
would make their reasoning solid and conclusive. In a first 
level of analysis we have reconstructed typical patterns of such 
reasoning on both sides of the fault lines. The results are more 
or less in line with Marsh (2006) who observed syllogistic 
patterns underlying crisis communication. But whereas Marsh 
restricts to deduction (i.e. applying a shared principle to draw 
a logical conclusion from the facts at hand), we also revealed 
other types of inference (for example, inductive classification 
of wild boar into harmful or dangerous animals and abductive 
explanation of any failed attempts to control them). 
The logical reconstructions were crucial for our subsequent 
understanding of rhetorical practices in the second level of 
analysis. Here we revealed that discussants in various public 
forums were using, among others, the classical rhetorical 
options available in each of the four staseis to subvert these 
logical structures. All this suggests that in their efforts to build a 
solid argument, participants in public debate do also recognise 
and act upon the logic of their opponents. 
Although this process of alternating affirmation and 
subversion points to both a surprisingly rational reasoning and 
a certain mutual interaction between the participants, it does 
little to stimulate new ideas and develop common ground, but 
rather sharpens and mirrors existing divisions along the fault 
lines. We suggest this is due in considerable part to inherent 
tendencies and associated practices within the debate itself. 
Especially relevant here are 1) the limited elaboration and 
deliberation on the issues of contention, and 2) the tendency 
of linking these issues to wider socio-political relationships. 
Limited Elaboration on the Issues of Contention
Frequently discussants used the staseis to quickly work their 
way towards a preferred judgement conclusion. Hence, factual 
statements often remained with little or no evidence to support 
(or reject) them, definitions appeared to stem from implicit 
principles and assumptions, and quality judgements were 
represented as principles beyond discussion or dismissed as 
irrelevant. Sometimes, facts (and especially numbers) were 
employed to make a jump directly to the stasis of jurisdiction. 
Due to the lack of elaboration and/or discussion in the 
respective staseis, many disagreements were insufficiently 
addressed and crucial questions remained unasked. The 
participants in debate follow the steps of stasis, but they barely 
stand still to elaborate and discuss on the issues of dissension. 
All this contrasts markedly from the original conceptualisation 
of staseis as temporary standings in-between contradictories 
or contrary statements (Dieter 1950). 
We propose the pursuit of deductive logic a crucial factor 
in the lack of ‘stand-still’. The use of deductive reasoning 
or judgement made from general principles was common 
practice in the debates over wildlife comeback. As we noted 
in the analysis, shared principles – including popular beliefs, 
common-sense wisdom and scientific theory – were usually 
beyond discussion and often taken as self-evident universals. 
Aden (1994) suggests that arguments in our postmodern age 
“function deductively, relying upon audience agreement of 
what’s already ‘known’ to create further argument”. We notice 
that, very often, arguments were based on unstated principles, 
leaving the audience to fill in the blanks. These may be simply 
the audience’s beliefs which are implicitly appealed to and 
used as support for one’s position. In this way, stating a single 
fact (e.g. returned foxes lack natural enemies) can be enough 
to attain a wanted conclusion (e.g. their population should 
be controlled). We do find attempts to challenge such beliefs 
– in particular advancing an alternative principle (e.g. self-
regulation of fox populations) – but overall the opportunities 
to elaborate and deliberate were limited. 
Another factor is the frequent use of logical opposition, 
in particular dichotomies. For example, the evaluation that 
a species belongs in Flanders involved defining its presence 
as a natural phenomenon and its absence as an unnatural 
situation caused by past human intervention. In former 
work, dichotomies have been mainly discussed because 
of their polarising effect, emphasising contradictions and 
incompatibilities between the poles (Dascal 2008), also in 
situations where gradations between the poles deserve to be 
explored (Govier 2009). Our stasis analysis brings to light how 
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dichotomies work in the debate by revealing their function in 
constructing and reinforcing the logical structures underlying 
the staseis, and invigorating arguments at both sides. By forcing 
a choice between two alternatives, dichotomies can facilitate the 
transition between the staseis, the movement or flow from one 
stasis to another. However, by doing so, dichotomies can rule 
out important alternatives without discussing and elaborating 
on them. Moreover, they may obscure the complexities that 
are necessary for full understanding (Berlin 1990). We observe 
here that judgements were based on a rather limited set of 
dichotomies that themselves remained unquestioned. This also 
rendered it difficult to open up possibilities for reconciling 
positions. Yet, on some occasions, attempts were made using 
the staseis to re-define the situation and put a new perspective 
on it, which ultimately made the dichotomy (e.g. harmful/
beneficial species) superfluous. 
Linking of Issues to Socio‑political Relationships
The second trend is discussants going ‘off-road’, away from 
the four steps of stasis and the core issues of contention, to 
make linkages to social and political relationships. As a result, 
the debate is no longer oriented to the returning animals, but 
instead gets mixed up with, among others, issues like political 
lobbying, confusing responsibilities, unequal power relations, 
and the presumed motives of those with a deviant opinion. This 
lateral move of relationship linking is likely to further intensify 
relational tensions as, almost inevitably, the debate gets focused 
on the characteristics and behaviour of those engaged in it 
(more on this below). In addition –- just like the fast-forward 
move toward judgement conclusion described above – it 
impedes opportunities for novel ideas to emerge as the issue 
that needs to be addressed is forced into the background (see 
also Heidlebaugh 2008). All of this makes it difficult for policy 
decision-making: the issues are never quite clear and, in the 
end, decisions (for example, to ease restrictions on fox hunting) 
are reached out of confusion rather than out of an issue-focused 
argument and reasoned judgement.
Our analysis reveals that such link-making practices tend 
to operate from the stasis of fact and the stasis of jurisdiction. 
In the latter, procedural questions are addressed which can 
be about any aspect of the process that led to the judgement 
or action. In the wildlife comeback debates we see that the 
legitimate or illegitimate roles of politicians and social groups 
(conservationists, hunters, farmers) in the decision-making 
process were a frequent topic that, however, extends in many 
directions. As a result, the stasis of jurisdiction may multiply 
to such an extent that it becomes impossible to address, as in 
Dimock’s (2009) ‘fragmented stasis’. But what is more, these 
relational matters also pave the way to crossing what Burnett 
and Olson (1998) call ‘the line of social appropriateness’. 
Discussants attempt to secure their relational position and 
just want to win, without concern for the larger bearing on 
societal relationships. We observe that discrediting persons 
and groups was an important target of rhetorical effort, from 
questioning their competence to accusing and blaming them. 
Such discrediting practices undermine possibilities for those 
being discredited to engage in further discussion and they 
(further) damage relationships, also beyond the debate. 
The other important starting point of relationship linking in 
wildlife comeback debates is the stasis of fact. We exemplified 
how participants in Internet discussions used abductive 
reasoning to explain surprising facts. These explanations were 
shared and turned into new facts to be explained, and so forth. 
While this dynamic reasoning is well suited for dealing with 
uncertain situations, leaving much to be explored jointly, it may 
easily turn the debate into an attack of one particular group of 
people (e.g. conservationists, hunters, dog owners) for their 
condemnable habits and alleged role in the event. All of this 
adds to the polarisation and fragmentation of the public debate. 
CONCLUSION
The above-discussed tendencies and practices in the debates 
over wildlife comeback are likely to contribute to the rhetorical 
power applied by the participants, however, with the unplanned 
result of even greater divides between them. The application of 
stasis theory offers good insight into how rhetorical strategies 
develop around fault-lines, and thus how they unwillingly add 
to the continuation and exacerbation of the conflict. Thus, 
instead of making the occurrence of dissent problematic – the 
conventional consensus approach – stasis theory starts from 
dissensus: contrarily thinking, speaking and acting are not 
considered problematic, but as a source of rhetorical invention 
focused on ‘the issue’ that must be addressed prior to moving 
from the stasis. Recent applications rightly conceptualise 
staseis as points of possibility, the opportunity at which 
discourse can be transformed (e.g. Graham and Herndl 2011). 
Indeed, if conflict is played out as a discursive power struggle, 
we should find ways for de-escalation and fruitful exchanges 
that characterise more dialogical communications. 
From a dialogue perspective it has been suggested that the 
more opponents in a discussion aim at arriving to one single 
truth, the more they will clash (Bohm 1990). In a dialogue, 
people accept differences and diversity and participants to a 
dialogue should thus be ready to openly discuss diverging 
viewpoints, including underlying assumptions, norms, fears 
and interests. The notion of the relevance of capitalising on 
differences and diversity for effective decision-making is not 
at all new. Some hundred years ago, Mary Parker Follett, for 
instance, argued in her famous book The New State, that to 
be a democrat “is to learn how to live with other men” (Follet 
1918: 22–23). Also, political theorist Chantal Mouffe (2000) 
considers conflict and diversity as the main starting point for 
what she calls radical democracy, arguing that, when accepting 
that we live in a society in which people are free to have their 
own opinions, it is unavoidable that opinions clash. It is thus not 
conflicting opinions that are the problem, but the way people 
communicate about them in different interaction contexts. As 
such, rhetorical practices applied in seemingly unimportant 
day-to-day discussions have important consequences for the 
course of the discussions themselves, but also for relationships 
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in the wider environment, resulting in an increasing tension and 
polarisation between groups in society. In the end, they shape 
societal structures and developments in ways that no one may 
have intended (Kim and Kim 2008). Serious investments in the 
development of dialogical skills and rhetorical awareness may 
help effectively communicate wildlife comebacks (and other 
conservation issues as well) by means of constructive dialogue.
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